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Navy Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) lacks a business process framework for the 
development of Business Continuity Management (BCM) plans. In the event business 
processes are deprived of automation for a prolonged period of time, the NAVSUP 
enterprise requires alternative methods to maintain the delivery of these products and 
services with minimum customer disruptions and financial losses. The purpose of this 
study was to review existing methodology to assess mission criticality of NAVSUP 
products and services and associated business processes. We focused on a single Navy 
supply chain segment, Re-Engineered Maritime Allowance Development (ReMAD). The 
ReMAD and ERP interfaces as well as the ReMAD contingency plan will provide a 
context to lean on for the development of a business process framework for the plan. 
Currently, the ReMAD contingency plan’s system recovery timelines and recovery point 
objectives are not sufficient to continue with the processing of Maritime allowances. The 
analysis will lead to the development of a BCM plan for ReMAD that will meet the 
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All organizations from public or private sectors face the possibility of disruptive 
events that have impacts ranging from mere inconvenience and short-lived disruption of 
normal business operations to the very destruction of the organization (Shaw, 2004). 
Navy Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) does not have a framework that can help 
develop a business continuity management (BCM) plan. If business processes do not 
have automation for an extended period of time, the NAVSUP enterprise will need 
alternative procedures to maintain the delivery of the products and services produced by 
these processes with minimum customer interruptions and fiscal losses. The purpose of 
this study is to analyze the existing NAVSUP products and services and associated 
business processes to identify the information necessary to continue the delivery of the 
critical process elements, and develop BCM and the associated information flow. This 
analysis will help with the development of a BCM framework applied against a Navy 
supply chain segment that will include recovery time and recovery point objectives. 
Navy Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) is an integrated business management 
system that updates and standardizes Navy business operations, provides financial 
transparency and total asset visibility across the enterprise, and increases effectiveness 
and efficiency. ERP is the generic name of a software-based management system used by 
forward-leaning corporations around the world to power their crucial “back office” 
business functions. The Navy ERP Program uses a product from SAP Corporation, which 
allows the Navy to unify, standardize, and streamline all its business activities into one 
completely integrated system. The first release of the system, implemented in October 
2007, focused on core financial and acquisition processes. The second release of the 
system in February 2010 added wholesale and retail supply business processes. 
Successful Navy command implementation of this business management system requires 
carefully planned and organized phased activities with specific timelines, sequences, and 
deliverables. Implementation guidance for Navy ERP provides details of the process and 
key information on structuring a command’s teams and efforts for success. It also 
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identifies critical success factors and provides timelines and checklists to help focus a 
command’s resources.  
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study is to develop a framework that NAVSUP can use to 
create a BCM plan that can help maintain the continuity of business processes with 
minimal customer disruptions and financial loss. In some way, the business process meets 
a requirement by delivering a product or service that sustains or improves readiness.   
The goal of a BCM is to provide the organization with the ability to effectively 
respond to threats such as natural disasters or data breaches and protect the business 
interests of the organization. BCM includes disaster recovery. The allowancing process, 
Reengineered Maritime Allowance Development (ReMAD) and ERP interfaces will give 
us a context to lean on as we develop the business process framework for the plan. These 
were chosen to provide structure and scope for the project. A good framework can be 
expanded in response to business process complexity and how and where the process is 
performed. In the end, it is about the readiness of operational forces, so a good BCM 
should answer a few questions. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Now we will discuss primary and secondary questions that should be considered 
when developing a framework for a BCM plan. This list is not exclusive, because it 
should be tailored to the organization’s requirements.   
1. Primary 
 What are the most likely threats to this business process? Can we mitigate 
the threats and vulnerabilities prior to an event? 
 What is the impact to readiness? 
 What are the key decision and plan of action and milestone (POA&M) 
points?  
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 At what point after an event does the process owner have to initiate the 
BCM?  
 What are the key lead times for critical POA&M points?  
2. Secondary 
 How does the exploitation of the business process vulnerability affect the 
ways and means we deliver the requirement? 
 Does the event drive a change in our business process temporarily (think 
manual processing) or permanently (think additional information 
assurance (IA), physical security or background investigation 
requirements)?  
 How will accountability be maintained during BCM plan execution? 
D. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
Senior management will have ultimate responsibility for creating and 
implementing the BCM plan. A BCM team leader should be designated in writing to carry out 
the approved plan with the assistance of the process owners. They must ensure that the BCM 
plan is written and distributed so several groups of people can help with the execution in a 
timely fashion (Griffith University [GU], 2013). It should be precise about what situations can 
prompt initiation of the plan. It should state the immediate steps to be taken whenever a 
disruption occurs. The plan should include an inventory of vital assets and resources needed to 
support critical processes. It should allow flexibility for the business to respond to unexpected 
threat situations and varying internal environments. Ultimately, management should ensure that 
the BCM plan’s main focus should be on how to get the business back online in regards to a 
specific capability, and work area or role that is interrupted, rather than on the exact nature of 
the disruption. Senior management and the BCM team leader are responsible for ensuring that 
the BCM plan is readily available to all process owners in electronic and hard copy formats on 
and off-site (GU, 2013). Figure 1 displays an example of a BCM team organization chart that 




Figure 1.  Business Continuity Team Organization Chart (from FEMA, 2014a) 
The organization chart covers essential team members for developing a successful 
plan. A BCM plan should clearly define and appropriately assign the roles and 
responsibilities of all stakeholders. The management and team members should 
collaborate to identify their critical strengths in the organization and recognize which 
weaknesses are important. Lines of authority, sequence of management, and delegation of 
authority must be identified to ensure the successful development and implementation of 
the BCM plan. They must also address communication with outside organizations 




II. RE-ENGINEERED MARITIME ALLOWANCE DEMAND  
A. OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to give an example of a Navy supply chain segment 
to highlight the needs for a BCM plan. This chapter will give a brief synopsis of what 
ReMAD is used for and the some basic functional interfaces used by the NAVSUP 
enterprise.   ReMAD and ERP interfaces along with the ReMAD contingency plan will 
provide context that can be used to develop the business process framework for the BCM 
plan.   
B. DEFINITION OF REMAD 
The ReMAD system was developed for the Department of the Navy (DON), 
Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP), and NAVSUP Business Systems Center 
(BSC). This system is a web-based, maritime parts-allowance support tool used by type 
commanders (TYCOM), as well as the NAVSUP enterprise. It is a government off-the-
shelf (GOTS) system that utilizes commercial application software modified to fulfill 
unique core—NAVSUP WSS mission requirements (NAVSUP, 2008). The users of the 
system include the operating sites: NAVSUP Weapon Systems Support (WSS) 
Allowancing, NAVSUP Allowancing Support, Naval Sea Logistics Center (NSLC) 
budget support, type commanders (TYCOM) platform managers, NAVSUP program 
managers, In-service engineering activities (ISEAs), supply officers, and other fleet 
personnel. Of particular importance, ReMAD augments Navy ERP designs by providing 
the sole means for fleet (i.e., shipboard/activity/ installation) allowances determination 
once legacy uniform inventory control point (UICP) processing is terminated (NAVSUP, 
2012).  
C. BACKGROUND 
ReMAD is the allowancing process used by NAVSUP WSS to achieve its core 
mission, which is to identify spare parts needed to repair Navy ships and weapon 
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systems. Existing maintenance products provide allowances based on partial information, 
and the current system needs a manual review of allowances (NAVSUP, 2008). 
ReMAD is a redesign and re-host maritime allowance calculation process that is 
web-based unlike its predecessor. The system has functionality improvements that can be 
used to increase platform readiness. It has a direct link to key data sources as well as 
automation that can help with other functions such as funds control and quality assurance. 
There is web access for the TYCOM and NAVSUP WSS. Another function that is 
available is the ability to conduct ad hoc queries and scenario based analyses. ReMAD 
can also interface with ERP for data and allowance distribution (NAVSUP 2008). 
Logistics Support, Incorporated (LSInc), a premier global provider of responsive 
management consulting, and logistics solutions, is the prime contractor that delivers 
support to NAVSUP WSS Mechanicsburg to create and refine requirements, 
documentation, testing, and implementation of the ReMAD system and its interface with 
ERP (LSInc, 2014). LSInc provides skill and knowledge of the allowance process and 
fleet interface including the ERP single supply solution, and other related program-level 
requirements. They also provide training on various aspects of allowancing and ReMAD 
to both government and contractor personnel (LSInc, 2014).  
Figure 2 displays the various inputs and outputs that ReMAD processes 
(NAVSUP, 2008). Some of the outputs interact with the ERP system as shown. 
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Figure 2.  ReMAD inputs and outputs (from NAVSUP, 2008) 
Below are some of the inputs and outputs (NAVSUP, 2008): 
Input to ReMAD from ERP 
 WSF-C allowance parts list (APL)-National Item Identification Number 
(NIIN data) 
 Old NIIN file (NIIN supersessions and cancellations) 
 Repairable identification code (RIC) supersessions and cancellations 
 Parent to accessory RIC data 
Output from ReMAD to ERP 
 Records for SNAP unit identification codes (UIC) 
 Specific format for non-automated UICs 
 Authorized allowances 
 Allowance deletions   
 Allowance projections  
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A discussion of the functional interfaces that exist between ERP and other 
systems is shown. The following describes how they all interact (Krause, 2010): 
 ERP will be the repository of RIC to NIIN data 
 RIC & NIIN information in WSF will reside in ERP 
 ERP will pass data to ReMAD, Readiness Suite and CDMD-OA 
 ReMAD will (Krause, 2010): 
 Perform maritime data validation, allowance computation, product 
scheduler, quality assurance and distribution vehicle 
 Store historical allowance information 
 Perform special allowance processes 
Receive data from and pass final allowance, sales order and sales quotes to 
ERP 
Readiness Suite (RS) will: 
 Perform calculations and support the retail allowance products 
 Perform effectiveness studies 
 Receive data from and pass sales quotes to ERP (for some products) 
CDMD-OA will (Krause, 2010): 
 Receive APL/NIIN and allowance data from ERP 
 Access the CAPs web page for product order info 
 Create allowance product text files 
 Distribute allowance product text files 
 Create CD-ROMs to DAPS 
 Post Data transfer to Text files  
InforM-21 will: 
 Receive allowance related information from ReMAD 
 Perform Ad-hoc queries and reports 
Figure 3 displays a block diagram of ReMAD and the various systems that 
interact with each other (Hynosky, 2010). 
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Figure 3.  Maritime Allowance System (from Hynosky, 2010). 
D. CONTINGENCY PLAN 
The purpose of the ReMAD Contingency Plan is to establish procedures to 
recover the system following a disruption (NAVSUP, 2012). The plan should include the 
following phases: the notification and activation phase that can detect, assess damage and 
the actual activation of the contingency plan. The recovery phase should be used to 
restore temporary IT operations and alleviate the effects that were caused by the damage 
to the original system. During the reconstitution phase, all capabilities should be restored 
to normal operations. All procedures and resources needed to continue normal business 
operations should be identified. Personnel should be designated and guidance provided to 
them on how to recover ReMAD during extended periods of interruption to normal 
operations. Ongoing coordination with all staff involved in the contingency planning is 
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an essential requirement for the plan to be a success as well as coordination with external 
points of contact who are involved in the contingency planning strategies (NAVSUP, 
2012). 
The ReMAD contingency plan applies to all functions and resources required in 
restoring continuity of operations at the Application Hosting Facility (AHF), Tulsa, 
Oklahoma. This contingency plan was established based on multiple assumptions. An 
example scenario used was the inaccessibility of the AHF. NAVSUP BSC/NAVSUP 
WSS/NAVSUP would be unable to perform an analysis using ReMAD (NAVSUP, 
2012). The following are some key assumptions that were made when the plan was 
developed (NAVSUP, 2012). ReMAD operations have been interrupted at the AHF 
computer center and will not be available within 48 hours/ two weeks/ two months. 
Essential ReMAD personnel have been identified and trained in their emergency 
response and recovery roles and they are readily available to activate the ReMAD 
Contingency Plan. Preventive controls (e.g., generators, environmental controls, 
waterproof tarps, sprinkler systems, fire extinguishers, and fire department assistance) 
have full operational capability whenever the disaster occurs (NAVSUP, 2012). Based on 
the 2012 contingency plan: 
Computer center equipment, including components supporting ReMAD, is 
linked to an uninterruptible power supply (UPS) that can provide 45 
minutes to 1 hour of power during power failure. The AHF cannot provide 
hardware and software support for ReMAD for at least 48 hours. An 
emergency evacuation of personnel at the AHF if inaccessible for at least 
48 hours should be activated. The blockhouse is the alternate site with 
trained personnel to assist in operation of ReMAD. Current backups of the 
application software and data are undamaged and accessible at the offsite 
storage facility. Agreements for service are maintained with ReMAD 
hardware, software, and communications providers to provide support to 
restore ReMAD to normal operations (NAVSUP, 2012). 
The plan establishes numerous teams to recover ReMAD operations. The specific 
actions performed by these teams are stated in the ReMAD contingency plan as well as 
detailed steps of the notification, activation, recovery and normal phase. The recovery 
timelines and recovery point objectives for the ReMAD system contingency plan cannot 
provide the support needed to continue with the processing of maritime allowances. The 
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following section cites two case studies that demonstrate how an organization mitigated 
issues during catastrophic events that led to disruptions to their business operations. 
E. INDUSTRIAL CASE STUDIES 
Valuable lessons can be learned from past experiences of others as well as 
industry best practices. Due to the fact that the following companies had adequate 
preparations for their organizations for untimely disturbances, they were not faced with 
prolonged interruptions to their business operations.   
a. Morgan Stanley 
In 1993, when terrorists initially attacked the World Trade Center, Morgan 
Stanley, a financial services company, learned a life-saving experience. It took the 
company four hours to evacuate its employees, some of whom had to walk down 60 or 
more flights of stairs to areas of safety. None of their employees were killed in the attack, 
but the company’s management decided their disaster plan was insufficient. They 
conducted a thorough risk assessment of their current plan, performed an analysis of a 
potential disaster risk and developed a multi-faceted disaster plan. Perhaps just as 
importantly, they practiced the plan frequently to provide for employee safety in the 
event of another disaster (FEMA, 2014c). 
On September 11, 2001, the planning and training brought excellent dividends. As 
soon as the first hijacked plane collided with One World Trade Center, Morgan Stanley 
security executives ordered the company’s 3,800 employees to evacuate from World 
Trade Center buildings, Two and Five. It only took 45 minutes for all employees to get 
out to safety (FEMA, 2014c). 
Due to effective crisis management and communication, Morgan Stanley was 
prepared to offer grief counseling to workers and increased its security presence. It also 
used effective communications strategies to provide timely, appropriate information to 
management and employees, investors and clients, and regulators and the media (FEMA, 
2014c). 
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Although Morgan Stanley had 13 casualties, many more could have died if the 
company had not had a solid disaster plan that was practiced over and over again during 
numerous training sessions. In making a commitment to prepare its most valuable asset, 
its people, Morgan Stanley ensured the firm’s future (FEMA, 2014c). 
b. John Deere 
“Safety and security of employees has always been a major priority for our 
company,” stated Allen Steinbeck, Director of John Deere Worldwide Security/Aviation. 
One of the oldest manufacturing companies in the United States, John Deere, is making 
emergency preparedness a company priority. Steinback is a member of the team that 
created the National Fire Protection Association’s (NFPA) 1600 standard on 
disaster/emergency management and business continuity. He utilized his experience and 
knowledge to help develop and implement best practices within John Deere (FEMA, 
2014c). 
Steinback stated, “planning for critical incidents and training employees on proper 
emergency procedures should become a standard throughout any business model,” and 
“The NFPA 1600 standard was instrumental in helping our security team identify the 
specific areas where our emergency plans needed to be enhanced (FEMA, 2014c). 
John Deere Worldwide Security has hired regional security managers working 
with an emergency preparedness manager (EPM) to ensure that all its elements have 
comprehensive and updated emergency action procedures that follow the corporate crisis 
management plan and the NFPA 1600 standards. The EPM is accountable for all 
emergency training, initiating a pandemic plan, recognizing and implementing best-
practices, obtaining technology to handle critical incidents, and various other emergency 
preparedness duties (FEMA, 2014c). 
Through extensive planning, preparation and training a company can possess the 
key elements for effective mitigation of an actual or potential crisis. All organizations 
should become familiar with current standards and remain diligent in implementing the 
applicable plan for their circumstances (FEMA, 2014c). 
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III. BUSINESS CONTINUITY MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
The details of how to develop a BCM framework will be discussed in this chapter. 
According to Protiviti, the development of strategies, policies and procedures set the 
foundation for a good BCM plan. This provides security or alternative methods of 
operation for business processes. If these processes were interrupted, the enterprise could 
suffer severe damage or significant loss that could be difficult to recover from. A BCM 
plan should be composed of the following three elements: crisis management and 
communications, business recovery planning, and information technology (IT) disaster 
recovery (DR) (Protiviti, 2013). 
A. RISK ASSESSMENT  
Business Continuity Institute  suggests that a management plan can be constructed 
from the BCM framework in Figure 4 (Business Continuity Institute [BCI], 2014a). Risk 
assessment can be defined as recognizing and prioritizing threats and disaster scenarios to 
which the enterprise may be vulnerable. Most risk management programs utilize a risk 
assessment tool to identify and prioritize threats, risks and failure scenarios. A BCM 
program incorporates these risk management strategies along with other methods to keep 
the business functioning whenever an event occurs and threatens essential business 
processes. Within BCM, a wide variety of risk management procedures are used; most 
classify and prioritize risk using a combination of likelihood (probability) and severity 
(impact). In addition to likelihood and severity, additional characteristics that may be 





Figure 4.  Business Continuity Framework Model  
Now that a good framework model has been presented, we will discuss the 
different types of risks that an enterprise could possibly face. The risk environment 
affecting critical infrastructure is complex and uncertain; threats, vulnerabilities, and 
consequences have all evolved over the last 10 years (Department of Homeland Security 
[DHS], 2011). DHS stated that the strategic national risk assessment (SNRA) describes 
numerous threats and susceptibilities to business processes in the extensive types of man-
made, natural, and technical threats. Critical resources, business systems, and networks 
face many of the threats characterized by the SNRA, including terrorists and other people 
trying to cause damage and interrupt vital services through physical and cyber-attacks, 
natural disasters, pandemic viruses or other health emergencies. The potential for 
interrelated events with unlimited consequences increases uncertainty as well as the 
identified risks evaluated as part of the SNRA (DHS, 2011). Figure 5 describes the 




Figure 5.  Evolving Threats to Critical Infrastructure (from DHS, 2013) 
Rising interdependencies across critical infrastructure systems, mainly 
dependence on data and communications technologies, have amplified the possible 
weaknesses to physical and cyber dangers and potential fears resulting from the 
compromise of essential systems. Critical infrastructure crosses domestic boundaries and 
international supply chains in a unified world. Due to our interdependence on technology, 
we can be greatly impacted by a diverse set of dangers (DHS, 2013). 
In addition, the effects of dangerous elements could threaten critical infrastructure 
that provides necessary services to the domestic population. Current and future variations 
to the environment have the potential to compound these dangers and could have a key 
effect on infrastructure processes. Lastly, susceptibilities also may occur as a result of a 
retiring work force or deficiency of experienced labor. Skilled operators are required for 
infrastructure upkeep and, hence, security and flexibility. Numerous issues impact the 
risk environment and, along with the policy and functioning environments, create the 
setting against which choices are made for critical infrastructure safety and resilience 
(DHS, 2011). Figure 6 provides a good example of how to assess risk (FEMA, 2014a). 
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Figure 6.  Risk Assessment Chart (from FEMA, 2014a) 
Next we discuss how to assess and analyze the risks. Critical infrastructure can be 
assessed in three categories: threat, vulnerability, and consequence. A threat is a natural 
or manufactured event or action that can possibly pose a threat to life, information, 
operations, the environment and property (DHS, 2013). Vulnerability is a physical feature 
or operational characteristic that renders an entity exposed to exploitation or susceptible 
to a given threat. A consequence is the effect of an event, incident, or occurrence. DHS 
mentions in a 2013 study that risk assessments are conducted by many critical 
infrastructure partners to inform their own decision making, using a wide variety of 
methodologies. These assessments permit critical infrastructure managers to comprehend 
the most likely and severe events that could disturb their operations and use this 
information to support preparation and resource allocation in a coordinated fashion. To 
assess risk successfully, critical infrastructure partners (owners and operators) need 
timely, dependable, and actionable data regarding threats, vulnerabilities, and 
consequences. Partners should comprehend intelligence and information requirements 
and conduct joint analysis where appropriate. In order to understand the risk to cyber and 
physical systems and assets, an assessment must be performed by the various members of 
the partnership. Neither public nor private sector entities can fully comprehend risk 
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without this integration of comprehensive knowledge and analysis (DHS, 2013). The 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides tools such as the Ready 
Business program to help managers and their workforce focus on business preparedness. 
Table 1 is an example of one of those tools that can be adapted by an organization for risk 
assessment (FEMA, 2014a).   
 
Table 1.   Risk Assessment Table (from FEMA, 2014a) 
B. BUSINESS IMPACT ANALYSIS 
Business impact analysis (BIA) is the process an organization uses to identify 
which functions are critical to the business and to ascertain the maximum acceptable 
outage (MAO) period for each identified function (BCI, 2014a). A comprehensive BIA 
should assess all key inputs and outputs for critical processes (Protiviti, 2013). The BIA 
is the second step in business continuity management cycle to identify and prioritize 
critical functions following a disruptive event, in order to achieve minimum service 
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delivery and identify resources required to aid in resumption of function after disruption. 
Outputs of this step include written reports describing probability of significant threats, 
the consequences of threat realization on the business process, and prioritization of the 
threats based on the likelihood of the consequences (NAVSUP, 2011a). BIA results 
determine how critical the system is to the supported mission and business processes, 
what impact the loss of the system could have on the organization, and the system 
recovery time objective (RTO). The BIA results can help determine the type and 
frequency of backup, the need for redundancy or mirroring of data, and the type of 
alternate site needed to meet system recovery objectives (Swanson, Bowen, Phillips, 
Gallup, and Lynes, 2013). The purpose of the BIA is to associate the system with the 
critical mission or business processes and services provided and identify the 
consequences of a disruption. The BIA process will vary based on industry dynamics, 
business complexity, use of technology, frequency of change, and management style. The 
four main elements are (Protiviti, 2013): 
1. Scoping—This includes IT and/or business functions which may be 
internally focused, or may include critical business partners, vendors and 
customers. The scope of the BIA drives all succeeding analytic efforts. 
2. Data collection—Data collection is most effective when prepared in 
group-facilitated sessions and individualized interviews. The use of 
surveys and a review of management reporting can be efficient method as 
well. 
3. Analyzing—in some organizations, quantitative impacts drive the process, 
whereas in others, qualitative impacts are just as important. Types of 
impacts that should be considered include:  
a. Work stoppage and idle workforce 
b. Regulatory violations or noncompliance 
c. Financial loss or delay 
d. Loss of stakeholder confidence 
e. Reputation impairment 
f. Environmental, health and safety (EHS) impairment 
g. Cash flow interruption 
h. Financial control and reporting exposure 
i. Customer service and strained vendor relations 
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j. Employee morale/retention 
k. Service level agreement (SLA) /contractual noncompliance 
4. Reporting—Text versus graphs, reports versus presentations. Corporate 
culture and audience should determine the exact format to ensure BIA 
findings are understood and actionable. 
The BIA results must be acknowledged by the executive management team before 
the rest of the BCM project can effectively take place. During impact analysis, each 
vulnerability needs to be rated based on the likelihood and consequence or impact in 
order to determine the vulnerability risk rating (NAVSUP BSC, 2011). The decision of 
which scale to use is insignificant. The important point is to use a risk rating that is a 
consistent and well defined scaling method within a capability. This enables the accurate 
and consistent prioritization of the vulnerabilities for future planning purposes. During 
prioritization, the extreme, high, or critical ratings represent vulnerabilities that must be 
addressed. The moderate or medium ratings may or may not be mitigated depending on 
the costs associated with the solution. Mitigation strategies are not normally established 
for low ratings unless the costs are minimal and the solution is easily implemented. 
The five-point matrix (Figure 7) uses likelihoods of rare, unlikely, moderate, 
likely and almost certain and consequences of insignificant, minor, moderate major and 







easily handled by 
























HIGH HIGH EXTREME EXTREME EXTREME 
Likely 
Between 50% and 
90% chance 
MODERATE HIGH HIGH EXTREME EXTREME 
Moderate 
Between 10% and 
50% chance 
LOW MODERATE HIGH EXTREME EXTREME 
Unlikely 
Between 3% and 
10% chance 




LOW LOW MODERATE HIGH HIGH 
Figure 7.  Five-point Matrix (from NAVSUP BSC, 2011) 
The three-point matrix (Figure 8) uses low, medium and high for both likelihood 
and consequence (NAVSUP BSC, 2011). 
 
HIGH MEDIUM HIGH CRITICAL 
MEDIUM LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
LOW LOW LOW MEDIUM 
 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
Figure 8.  Three-point Matrix (from NAVSUP BSC, 2011) 
C. RECOVERY STRATEGY 
Recovery strategy is the third step in the BCM cycle which will be based on the 
results of the BIA. In order to develop a solid recovery strategy, the capability leadership 
team must have a thorough understanding of the capability processes. A recovery strategy 
focuses on maintaining the mission regardless of what is or is not available such as IT 
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services, facilities, infrastructure, personnel, etc. (NAVSUP, 2011a). The output of this 
step is a written report outlining the vulnerabilities and threats requiring action along with 
a description of the mitigation plan and/or contingency plan along with a breakdown of 
the cost requirements. For the purpose of this report, contingency plan will not be 
thoroughly discussed. Determination and selection of strategy is based on outputs from 
the BIA, and built upon the maximum acceptable outage (MAO) identified for each 
critical process. Senior management will determine appropriate business continuity 
strategy in order to (GU, 2013): 
1. Protect core functions and critical business processes; 
2. Stabilize, sustain, recover and restore functions, services, critical processes 
and their dependencies and supporting resources. 
Response strategy will be informed by approved time frames for recovery of 
critical processes. There are three ways to identify downtime (NAVSUP, 2011b): 
1. Maximum tolerable downtime (MTD). The MTD represents the total 
amount of time the system owner/authorizing official is willing to accept 
for a mission/business process outage or disruption and includes all impact 
considerations. Determining MTD is important because it could leave 
contingency planners with inaccurate direction on (1) selection of an 
appropriate recovery method, and (2) the depth of detail which will be 
required when developing recovery procedures, including their scope and 
content. 
2. Recovery time objective (RTO). RTO is the target time for resuming the 
delivery of a product of service to an acceptable level following its 
disruption (GU, 2013). It defines the maximum amount of time that a 
system resource can remain unavailable before there is an unacceptable 
impact on other system resources, supported mission/business processes, 
and the MTD. Determining the information system resource RTO is 
important for selecting appropriate technologies that are best suited for 
meeting the MTD. When it is not feasible to immediately meet the RTO 
and the MTD is inflexible, a plan of action and milestone (POA&M) 
should be initiated to document the situation and plan for its mitigation. 
3. Recovery Point Objective (RPO). The RPO represents the point in time, 
prior to a disruption or system outage, to which mission/business process 
data can be recovered (given the most recent backup copy of the data) 
after an outage. Unlike RTO, RPO is not considered as part of MTD. 
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Rather, it is a factor of how much data loss the mission/business process 
can tolerate during the recovery process. 
Because the RTO must ensure that the MTD is not exceeded, the RTO must 
normally be shorter than the MTD. For example, a system outage may prevent a 
particular process from being completed, and because it takes time to reprocess the data, 
that additional processing time must be added to the RTO to stay within the time limit 
established by the MTD. 
When selecting response strategies the following should be considered: 
 The type of hazard(s) the group is exposed to; 
 Alternate procedures for carrying out the process to completion or to a 
minimum; 
 Acceptable level until recovery can be effected; 
 Manual processing abilities and related costs; 
 Use of insurance (replace rather than salvage—if applicable); 
 Third party arrangements, business partnering/dependencies, sector mutual 
aid; 
 Business cycles and peak periods; 
 Internal resource capabilities, critical supply chains and vendor 
management; 
 Deciding whether or not an alternative site is required; 
 Accessibility of data; 
 The option to do nothing—deciding how much the business can afford to 
lose 
If a facility is damaged, production machinery breaks down, a supplier fails to 
deliver or information technology is disrupted, business is impacted and the financial 
losses can begin to grow. Recovery strategies are alternate means to restore business 
operations to a minimum acceptable level following a business disruption and are 
prioritized by the RTO developed during the business impact analysis. 
Recovery strategies require resources including people, facilities, equipment, 
materials and information technology. An analysis of the resources required to execute 
recovery strategies should be conducted to identify gaps. For example, if a machine fails 
 23 
but other machines are readily available to make up lost production, then there is no 
resource gap. However, if all machines are lost due to a flood, and insufficient 
undamaged inventory is available to meet customer demand until production is restored, 
production might be made up by machines at another facility—whether owned or 
contracted.  
Strategies may involve contracting with an outside firm, entering into partnership 
or reciprocal agreements. The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), provides 
remote recovery capability, or continuity of operations (COOP) in accordance with 
standards and regulatory requirements outlined in DOD Instruction (DODI) 8500.2 
including continuity—related information assurance (IA) controls. For disaster and 
recovery planning, DISA ensures plans and procedures exist to allow resumption within 
required time frames (DISA, 2014). 
Also consider manual processing options, or establishing a remote, redundant site 
for mission—critical operations, which will be composed of staff with in-depth 
knowledge of business functions and processes that are in the best position to determine 
what will work.  
Vin D’Amico, an agility expert on business continuity planning states that 
possible alternatives should be explored and presented to management for approval and 
to decide how much to spend (2004). Depending upon the size of the company and 
resources available, there may be many recovery strategies that can be explored. 
Utilization of other owned or controlled facilities performing similar work is one 
option. Operations may be relocated to an alternate site—assuming both are not impacted 
by the same incident. This strategy also assumes that the surviving site has the resources 
and capacity to assume the work of the impacted site. Prioritization of production or 
service levels, providing additional staff and resources and other action would be needed 
if capacity at the second site is inadequate. 
Telecommuting is a strategy employed when staff can work from home through 
remote connectivity. It can be used in combination with other strategies to reduce 
alternate site requirements. This strategy requires ensuring telecommuters have a suitable 
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home work environment and are equipped with or have access to a computer with 
required applications and data, peripherals, and a secure broadband connection. 
In an emergency, space at another facility can be put to use. Cafeterias, 
conference rooms and training rooms can be converted to office space or to other uses 
when needed. Equipping converted space with furnishings, equipment, power, 
connectivity and other resources would be required to meet the needs of workers. 
Partnership or reciprocal agreements can be arranged with other businesses or 
organizations that can support each other in the event of a disaster. Assuming space is 
available, issues such as the capacity and connectivity of telecommunications and 
information technology, protection of privacy and intellectual property, the impacts to 
each other’s operation and allocating expenses must be addressed. Agreements should be 
negotiated in writing and documented in the business continuity plan. Periodic review of 
the agreement is needed to determine if there is a change in the ability of each party to 
support the other. 
There are many vendors that support business continuity and information 
technology recovery strategies. External suppliers can provide a full business 
environment including office space and live data centers ready to be occupied. Other 
options include provision of technology equipped office trailers, replacement machinery 
and other equipment. The availability and cost of these options can be affected when a 
regional disaster results in competition for these resources. 
There are multiple strategies for recovery of manufacturing operations. Many of 
these strategies include use of existing owned or leased facilities. Manufacturing 
strategies include: 
 Shifting production from one facility to another 
 Increasing manufacturing output at operational facilities 
 Retooling production from one item to another 
 Prioritization of production—by profit margin or customer relationship 
 Maintaining higher raw materials or finished goods inventory 
 Reallocating existing inventory, repurchase or buyback of inventory 
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 Limiting orders (e.g., maximum order size or unit quantity) 
 Contracting with third parties 
 Purchasing business interruption insurance 
The following factors should be considered in manufacturing recovery strategies: 
 Will a facility be available when needed? 
 How much time will it take to shift production from one product to 
another? 
 How much will it cost to shift production from one product to another? 
 How much revenue would be lost when displacing other production? 
 How much extra time will it take to receive raw materials or ship finished 
goods to customers? Will the extra time impact customer relationships? 
 Are there any regulations that would restrict shifting production? 
 What quality issues could arise if production is shifted or outsourced? 
 Are there any long-term consequences associated with a strategy? 
D. PLAN DEVELOPMENT 
Software is not required to develop a good BCM plan but it can be a helpful tool. 
Most organizations decide to create a BCM plan utilizing normal, word-based templates 
typically used by smaller and medium-sized, single-site organizations. Though, a rising 
number of businesses, mainly larger, geographically isolated organizations, are choosing 
to implement software solutions to develop plans, manage content and distribute updated 
plan documentation. Furthermore, some organizations are using pre-existing tools such as 
SharePoint to establish, share and maintain BCM plans (Protiviti, 2013). Figure 9 
displays a business continuity planning process diagram that can be used for plan 
development (FEMA, 2014a). 
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Figure 9.  Business Continuity Planning Process Diagram 
 (from FEMA, 2014a) 
Even though software solutions can add value, managers should address three 
important concerns to make the investment payoff (Protiviti, 2010): 
1. Recognize that software and template customization is needed before 
implementation and use. Purchasing software does not mean the 
organization is purchasing a plan. 
2. Access controls should be implemented to protect sensitive information 
and adhere to privacy concerns. 
3. “Fantasy plans” can create a false sense of security. Organizations that 
acquire business continuity software tools must beware of the “solution in 
a box” syndrome. A tool set can be a great aid, but the development of 
effective business resumption or IT disaster recovery plans requires people 
with the right skills and experience. 
Resource management is a vital part of the BCM plan that is used to ensure the 
business has the resources needed to be properly prepared. Those resources include 
(Protiviti, 2013):  
 People 
 Facilities 
 Communications and warning technologies 
 Fire protection and life safety systems 
 Pollution control systems 
 Equipment 
 Materials and supplies 
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 Funding 
 Special expertise 
 Information about the threats or hazards 
If a primary facility cannot be used for normal business operations, an appropriate 
alternate facility can be used until the primary facility is back online. The alternate 
facility is considered a resource for the business continuity plan (Protiviti, 2010). 
A needs assessment should be performed to decide what resources are needed. 
Resources may derive from within the business and may be comprised of trained 
employees, protection and safety systems, communications equipment and other services 
owned or leased by the business. External resources such as public emergency services, 
business partners, vendors and contractors are essential in preparing and developing the 
BCM plan (Protiviti, 2010). 
The accessibility and capability of resources must be determined because some 
resources might be required immediately. The availability of resources often hinge on 
logistics. Logistics is the organization of resources to get them to a specific place at a 
specific time to ensure that the effects of a disruption or loss are minimized (Protiviti, 
2010). Assessing resources for the preparedness program starts with reviewing program 
objectives and performance goals. The top goals that an organization wants to achieve 
include (FEMA, 2014a):  
 Protect the safety of employees, visitors, contractors and others who may 
be at risk from hazards at the facility 
 Maintain customer service by minimizing disruptions of business 
operations 
 Protect facilities, physical assets and electronic information 
 Prevent environmental pollution 
 Protect the organization’s brand, image, and reputation 
For each objective, a valuation of resources is needed to achieve the desired 
results. Simple objectives may require limited resources. Complex objectives will require 
numerous resources with significant capabilities that can be readily available. It can 
prove difficult to obtain your desired objectives without adequate resources, or if the 
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available resources are deficient of the required capabilities. When the organization is 
identifying certain resources for the preparedness program, the assessment should answer 
the following questions: (FEMA, 2014a) 
 What quantity of a resource is required?  
 When will the resource be needed? 
 What capability does the resource need to have?  
 Are there any limitations? 
 What is the cost for procuring or having the resource available?  
 Are there any liabilities associated with use of the resource?  
Table 2 displays an example of a worksheet that FEMA utilizes to list a 
company’s resource requirements (FEMA, 2014a). 
 
Table 2.   Business Continuity Resource Requirements (from FEMA, 2014a) 
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The importance of an emergency response plan is essential to ensure that services 
are not interrupted for prolonged periods of time. The initial actions that an organization 
takes at the beginning of the emergency are crucial. A quick caution to employees to 
evacuate, shelter or lockdown can save lives (FEMA, 2014a). The first step to develop an 
emergency response plan is to perform a risk assessment to identify emergency scenarios 
that could possible happen at your organization. This risk assessment should have already 
been conducted as outlined earlier. Having an understanding of what can occur will 
enable the organization to control resource requirements and help with the development 
of plans and procedures to keep the business prepared for any situation that may arise 
(FEMA, 2014a). This emergency plan should be in line with your performance 
objectives. Table 3 displays an example of a worksheet that FEMA utilizes to list a 
company’s emergency response resource requirements (FEMA, 2014a). 
 
Table 3.   Emergency Response Resource Requirements 
(from FEMA, 2014a) 
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At a minimum, each facility should develop and implement an emergency plan 
for protecting employees, visitors, contractors and anyone else in the facility. This part of 
the emergency plan is called “protective actions for life safety” and includes building 
evacuation (“fire drills”), sheltering from severe weather such as tornadoes, “shelter-in-
place” from an exterior airborne hazard such as a chemical release and lockdown. When 
the facility goes into lockdown, it is important to protect the organization from an act of 
violence. Life safety should always be the first priority whenever an emergency occurs. 
The second should be to stabilize the incident before further damage can be done. Details 
of how to stabilize incidents should be thoroughly explained in the emergency response 
plan. A plan should be developed to ensure that resources can be readily available to 
ensure a facility is properly prepared when an emergency occurs. The plan should also 
include a process for damage assessment, salvage, protection of undamaged property and 
cleanup following an incident. These actions can be used to minimize further damage and 
decrease the time that the business or its processes are disrupted (FEMA, 2014a). 
Communication is essential when an emergency occurs and it must happen 
immediately. Once business operations are interrupted, customers want to know how they 
will be impacted and for how long. Employees and their families will be concerned and 
they will want information about the current situation. This is why it is important to 
develop a crisis communications plan as part of the emergency response plan. A business 
must be able to respond quickly, precisely and confidently during an emergency in the 
hours and days that follow. Many different audiences must be reached with information 
specific to their interests and needs. If the incident is not handled properly, there could be 
positive or negative impacts on the business brought on by public perceptions. The 
business has to be able to identify potential audiences and determine their need for 
information and then decide who within the business can best communicate with that 
audience. The following is a list of potential audiences (FEMA, 2014a):  
 Customers 
 Survivors impacted by the incident and their families 
 Employees and their families 
 News media 
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 Community—especially neighbors living near the facility 
 Company management, directors and investors 
 Government elected officials, regulators and other authorities 
 Suppliers 
Another plan that should be created as part of the BCM plan is an information 
technology disaster recovery plan (IT DRP). Businesses utilize information technology to 
quickly and effectively process information. It is also used for various means of 
communication. Electronic data interchange (EDI) is used to transmit data as well as 
orders and payments from one business to another. Companies use network servers to 
process information and store huge volumes of data. Desktop computers, laptops and 
wireless devices are used by employees to create, process, store, and manage data as well 
as communicate information with other entities and businesses.  
An important question has to be answered. What do you do when your 
information technology stops working? This is why it is important that a business 
develop an IT DRP in conjunction with a BCM plan.  
The business objectives for information technology should be developed during 
the BIA phase. Technology recovery strategies (previously discussed during this report) 
should be developed to restore hardware, applications and data in time to meet the needs 
of the business recovery. Organizations manage large volumes of electronic data that are 
vital to the survival and continued operation of the business. There could be significant 
implications if data is lost or corrupted due to hardware failure, human error, and cyber-
attacks (FEMA, 2014a). This is why it is essential for a plan to be developed for data 
backup and restoration of electronic information (Swanson et al., 2010). 
After reviewing various resources, it is recommended that the organization’s 
BCM plan focus on the specific content necessary to enable effective response and 
recovery activities. Most importantly the written strategy should comply with 
government regulations, which provide specific guidance pertaining to business 
continuity strategy.   Since BC or DR regulations do not apply in all situations, it is 
imperative that an organization understands the statutes governing data accessibility, 
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reliability, and compliance prior to developing the BCM plan. Regulations will be briefly 
discussed in Chapter IV. 
This BCM plan should also address the facilities and resources required to enable 
affected business operations and processes to resume without any further delays. When 
developing the BCM plan careful attention should be given to using checklists and flow 
charts to summarize response and recovery procedures. Lastly, an organization should 
schedule exercises to test the plan and identify areas for improvement (Protiviti, 2013).  
E. TESTING, TRAINING AND EXERCISE 
In the event of a business disruption, all essential personnel involved in the 
BCM process should understand their roles and responsibilities. Personnel should 
regularly rehearse their roles to test the BCP practicality, validate its currency, confirm 
their competence and confidence and test their assumptions around access to resources 
(GU, 2013). 
BCM training should be mandatory for all personnel. This requires a strict 
regimen of receiving specific instruction involving actual execution of BCM activities. It 
is necessary to evaluate the effectiveness or capabilities of the plan and solidifying that 
instruction with actual proficiency exercises. Key partners and suppliers should also be 
considered at the appropriate times. This training may be provided through classroom 
workshops using instruction manuals, computer-based interactive learning, and/or 
instructional guides and templates or other ad hoc communication methods.  
Some organizations utilize BCP testing exercises as a means of training their 
employees, but beware of the potential pitfalls of doing so. It is not uncommon for testing 
exercises to reveal discrepancies or weaknesses in the BCP program that need to be 
addressed. Training should involve the actual execution of business continuity testing 
activities necessary to evaluate the effectiveness or capabilities of the plan, awareness 
may be provided through workshops, instruction manuals, email communication or other 
ad hoc communication methods. 
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No emergency plan is ever actually finished. The external work environment is 
constantly changing, and people, methods, tools and systems within your organization 
change. Therefore, there is no endpoint to the process of training, testing, and revising the 
plan.  
Apply the following concepts in the same priority order—train, test and maintain:  
1. The individual readiness plan 
2. The emergency action checklist 
3. The business continuity plan.  
It is insufficient to gather resources and write the plan. If it is to remain 
functional, it must be continually tested and updated, and if that is to happen, it requires 
the ongoing support of senior management. Everyone in the workplace must be included 
in training, and at the appropriate times one may wish to include key partners and 
suppliers. Simply instructing staff to read the plan is not training, and does not provide 
the benefits of discussion and practice.  
Training can be as simple as a discussion during a regular meeting, or as complex 
as a full-scale exercise. Training should be planned and scheduled so that staff can 
methodically move through each major area of the plan. We suggest by appointing 
someone to develop a training plan for the year. For a 12-month period, determine 
(CEMA, 2006): 
 Who will be trained? 
 Who will do the training? 
 What training activities will be used? 
 When and where sessions will take place? 
 How the session will be evaluated and documented? 
General training for all employees should address: 
 Individual roles and responsibilities 
 Information about threats, hazards and protective actions 
 Means for locating family members in a crisis 
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 Office notification, warning and communication systems and procedures 
 Proper crisis response procedures 
 Location and use of common emergency equipment 
 Testing of preparedness strategies and plans 
Training can take many forms. There are several levels of training activities you 
should consider: 
 Orientation and education sessions. These are discussion sessions to 
provide basic information, answer questions and identify needs and 
concerns. 
 Tabletop exercise. A session facilitated by one or more individuals. The 
staff meets in a conference room setting to discuss their responsibilities 
and how they would react to various crisis scenarios. 
 Walk-through drill. This is a facilitated exercise where all participants 
actually perform their functions for the given scenario. A walk-through 
requires more preparation, takes more time and in general is more labor 
intensive than the previous training methods. They often reveal problems 
not revealed in simpler forms of training. 
 Functional drill. These are targeted drills that are designed to test a 
specific area of response such as emergency medical response, warning 
and communications procedures or an evacuation or sheltering problem. 
 Full-scale exercise. A real-life emergency situation is simulated as closely 
as possible. This level of exercise would typically involve not only your 
staff, but community first-response agencies as well. These are complex 
drills that take a great deal of planning and coordination among all the 
internal and external actors.  
F. RESOURCES 
There are many resources available that can be utilized by the organization to 
prepare for future disruptive events that can affect business processes. Software is 
available from vendors for purchase or downloaded at no cost. The Business Continuity 
Planning Suite is free downloadable software that is highly recommended. This software 
was created for any business with the need to create, improve, or update its business 
continuity plan. It was developed by DHS National Protection and Programs Directorate 
and FEMA for use on personal computers. It is accessible for optimal use by 
organizations and comprised of a business continuity plan (BCP) training, automated 
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BCP and disaster recovery plan (DRP) generators, and a self-directed exercise for testing 
an implemented BCP. Organizations can utilize this software solution to maintain or 
resume normal operations and provide flexibility during a disruption (FEMA, 2014b).   
The BCP training module of the software is a 30 minute video-based course, 
which examines the importance of BCP, provides a synopsis on business continuity and 
prepares users to create their own plans. It focuses on three elements of BCP (FEMA, 
2014b):   
 What is business continuity planning? 
 Why is business continuity planning important? 
 What is the business continuity planning process? 
Upon completion of the training, an organization should possess a rudimentary 
understanding of BCP, the process of developing and completing a BCP, and the 
motivation to complete its own plan using the software’s BCP generator (FEMA, 2014b). 
The BCP and DRP generators were developed to guide businesses through the 
writing process for continuity plans. They have an overall functionality comparable to 
automated tax preparation tools. The BCP Generator constructs a plan that guides a 
company through any disruption to normal business processes or operations, while the 
DRP Generator focuses on creating a plan specific to recovery of information technology 
systems. A save and exit option in both generators allows users to complete their plans in 
increments, and a print option permits users to produce and save hard copies for review 
(FEMA, 2014b). 
The final section of the BCP Suite is a self-directed exercise for testing an 
implemented BCP and it allows users to test their newly implemented business continuity 
and disaster recovery plans. This homeland security exercise, evaluation program, and  
compliant table top exercise centers on a business’ recovery efforts following selected 
business disruptions intended to represent a broad spectrum of threats that include a 
hurricane, earthquake, ice storm, and blackout. The objective of the exercise is to 
improve an organization’s overall recovery capabilities and actions and the joint decision 
making process. This process is supposed to lead to an open, stimulating exchange of 
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philosophies to help develop and expand existing knowledge of policies and procedures 
within the framework of an organization’s BCP implementation. 
BCI highly recommends The Good Practice Guidelines (GPG), which is a reliable 
reference for good business continuity practices globally. The GPG embodies current 
global philosophy which includes terminology from ISO 22301:2012, the International 
Standard for business continuity management systems (BCI, 2014b). 
The GPG draws upon the extensive academic, technical and practical experiences 
and aptitude of business continuity professionals from around the BCI’s global statutory 
membership. It also is subjected to a rigorous quality assurance process to ensure it 
continues to adhere to the highest standards in business continuity practices worldwide 
(BCI, 2014b). 
The true value of the GPG to the business continuity community is that it 
considers not just the ‘what’ to do but also the ‘why’, ‘how’ and ‘when’ of common 
practices used by real-world experts. Although the GPG provides a robust and well 
proven guide for all participants of business continuity, it also serves as a standard 
industry benchmark against which all organizations can be effectively measured.   This 
would lead to a thorough examination of an organization’s professional and technical 
capabilities (BCI, 2014b).  
There are six practices that are included in the GPG are policy and program 
management, analysis, design, implementation, validation and embedding business 
continuity. These six sections comprise the BCM life cycle, which is essential to good 
business continuity practice and ensures the success of any BCM program and its 






Regulatory compliance is a significant factor influencing the development of 
business continuity strategy. While business continuity or disaster recovery regulations 
may not apply in every business situation, a general understanding of legislation 
governing data availability, integrity, and compliance is helpful for any organization 
developing a business continuity strategy. Essentially, there are two specific types of 
regulations: 
 Standards and requirements that must be met in order to become a member 
of an organization (e.g., International Standardization Organization 
[ISO]). 
 Government regulations (see Table 4), which industries must follow in 
order to do business. These regulations protect the security of citizens and 
create national standards of uniformity.  
Vin D’Amico (2004) says, according to the Association of Records Managers and 
Administrators, about 60 percent of businesses that experience a major disaster such as a 
fire close within two years. The Labor Department statistics showed over 40 percent of 
all companies that experience a disaster never reopen and more than 25 percent of those 











Establishes requirements for 
BC plans and response 
readiness BC plans must be 
able to sustain operations for 
30 days 
All BC plans must be maintained 
at a high level of readiness, must 
be capable of implementation 
without warning, must be 
operational within 12 hours of 
activation 
FEMA FRPG 01–94 
All department and agency 
heads must formally plan for 
continuity of essential 
operations 
Written documents for BC must 
be maintained and current 
Federal Information 
Security Management 
Act (FISMA) 2002 
Requires electronic data to 
be available during a crisis 












Requires electronic data to 
be available during a crisis 
Emphasis of FISMA is on data 
security 




Requires BC/DR and COOP 
plans 
 
NIST 800–53 2005 
Recommended security 
controls for Federal 
Information systems 
Mandatory security controls 
that have specific 
requirements for continuity 
planning and testing 
Specific details on policy and 
procedures, plans, training, 




Statement No. 34 1999 
Requires a BC/DR plan to 
ensure that agency’s mission 
continues in time of crisis 
Applies to all government 
entities that operate utilities 
Table 4.   List of Government Regulations 
B. POLICY 
In an effort to enhance the readiness posture, the Deputy Secretary of Defense 
issued the DOD Directive 3020.26 on January 9, 2009 which outlines the Department of 
Defense Continuity Program (see Figure 10). It revises continuity policies and assigns 
responsibilities for developing and maintaining defense continuity programs. This 
directive applies to all the DOD components. For a compiled list of directives and 
instructions in related to business continuity and information awareness, see appendix A. 
The directive defines the following terminologies: 
 Continuity of government (COG): A synchronized effort within each 
branch of government to ensure capability of continuing a minimum of 
branch-essential responsibilities in a catastrophic crisis. COG relies on 
effective continuity of operations plans and capabilities. 
 Continuity of operations (COOP): The internal effort of each DOD 
components in ensuring uninterrupted, essential functions across a wide 
range of possible emergencies— including local acts of nature, accidents, 
and technological attacks— and related disasters. 
 Enduring constitutional government (ECG): A cooperative effort between 
the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the federal government, 
coordinated by the President, to preserve the capability for executing 
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constitutional responsibilities in catastrophic crises. ECG is the 
overarching goal; its objective is the preservation of the constitutional 
framework under which the Nation is governed. ECG relies on effective 
COOP and COG capabilities. 
 Mission essential functions (MEFs): The stated or implied responsibilities 
performed by or derived from statutes, executive orders, or other 
appropriate guidance. These organizational activities must be performed 
under all circumstances to achieve DOD component missions or 
responsibilities in a business continuity threat or event. Failure to 
accomplish or sustain these functions would considerably affect the 
Department of Defense’s ability to provide vital services or exercise 





Figure 10.  Excerpt from DOD Directive 3020.26, Department of Defense 
Continuity Program (2009) 
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V. CONCLUSION  
A. FINDINGS 
After completing our analysis and comparison with industry standards and case 
studies, first, we identified the threats to the business process and mitigation strategies. 
We also identified readiness impacts, key decision, and POA&M to initiate. Second, we 
formulated a framework that exploited vulnerabilities which would drive a change to the 
business process. Lastly, as a result of our research and comparison of different business 
processes used by various organizations in the civilian sector, we discovered that one the 
most effective step-by-step process that can be applied to the BCM framework is the ten 
step process.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Vin D’Amico, (2004) summarized the steps in surviving a disaster and we linked 
the Navy business process in an effort to maintain business continuity in the event of a 
disruption.   
The steps that follow are based on three critical elements for creating an 
effective survival strategy: people, process and technology. 
1. People are the single most important aspect of recovering from a disaster. 
People are the organization’s most valuable asset. Reassuring and educating 
them in advance of an emergency situation is the first critical success factor. By 
defining how personnel should react to a crisis and providing them information 
and tools to manage that reaction, the impact will be reduced and streamline 
the transition to emergency operations. 
2. Process is the next major element. There are dozens, hundreds, possibly 
thousands of business processes that the organization executes daily. Some are 
mission-critical, some are secondary and the rest are f o r  r o u t i n e  support. 
P rocesses need to be defined based on mission criticality and how to keep those 
processes operating when disaster occurs. 
3. Technology not just refers to computers and software. You also need to 
consider production machinery, network equipment, printers, telephones, fax 
machines, copiers, etc. Some or all of this technology may be unavailable 
during a disaster. 
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Below is a summary of the Ten Steps during Business Recovery, which identifies 
the critical elements. 
People 
1. Assemble a multi-disciplined planning team 
2. Name a sponsor and a planning team leader 
3. Define roles and recovery team participants 
Process 
4. Catalog your business processes 
5. Conduct an impact analysis 
6. Assess business recovery options 
7. Document and test the BCM plan 
Technology 
8. Identify critical systems 
9. Examine system administration procedures 
10. Consider redundancy options 
Below is a detailed discussion of the ten steps and their critical elements to help in 
the development of a BCM. 
1. People 
When disruptive events occur, a l l  work  s tops. People typically do not know 
what to do or how to react. Planning efforts will minimize this behavior. Ultimately, 
people are the most important factor in recovering from disaster. Therefore, focus on the 
people factors first. 
 Assemble a multi-disciplined planning team who will create the roadmap 
for managing a disaster or disruption. Identify representatives from all 
departments who are knowledgeable about the business process. Consider 
representation from customer service, facilities, finance, human resources, 
IT or network management, operations, purchasing, sales, security, and/or 
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systems administration. The idea is to identify a mix of skills within the 
organization. The team will define business requirements, analyze the 
business impact of various disaster types, design the survival process, 
identify members of the recovery team, document the survival plan, and 
oversee testing of the plan. Make sure there is a good cross-section of 
roles and levels within the organization. People on the planning team 
should be intimately familiar with company operations. Management staff 
alone may not know enough of the details to create a thorough survival 
roadmap. 
 Select an executive-level manager and a planning team leader. This is 
important!  The executive manager must be an active participant in the 
planning process. The efforts required will span the entire organization 
and require cooperation from multiple departments. This person must be 
formally designated and be able to clear roadblocks and resolve issues. 
The planning team leader is the point person for the BCM process. The 
team leader must assemble the multi-disciplined planning team and lead 
them in developing business recovery strategies. This person should be a 
good leader with enough knowledge of the business to be able to ask the 
right questions and seek out cost-effective answers. 
 Define roles and choose participants for the recovery team. The recovery 
team is responsible for overseeing execution of the survival plan. Team 
members coordinate activities and lead the recovery efforts within their 
respective operational areas. They will choose the personnel who will 
perform specific activities after any declared disaster. The recovery team 
leader must be designated with the authority to make quick decisions and 
draw upon whatever resources are needed. The recovery team may be 
similar to the planning team.  
2. Process 
We will turn our attention to business processes. The organization should identify 
the mission-critical processes that represent the backbone of the business. Each process 
will need people, technology, and logistics to operate effectively. People needs include 
specific roles and responsibilities that execute a process. Technology needs include 
essential hardware and software systems for automating the process. Logistics needs 
include transportation to and from the disaster site as well as a separate recovery site, if 
one is included in the plan. 
1. Catalog the business processes by conducting an inventory of the process 
components. Solicit information from process owners and managers in 
order to define the activities within departments that are most critical to 
the business. Consider what really matters to the business. Processes that 
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don’t make the inventory list may be vital to the long-term success of the 
organization but not critical to short-term survival. 
2. Conduct a BIA once the major processes are identified. What would be the 
impact on the business if this process could not be performed for several 
days? Prioritize the business processes based on the BIA. Use three levels 
of priority. For example: 
 Processes that need to be resumed within 24 hours to prevent 
serious business impact, such as loss of revenue or a serious 
adverse impact to customers. 
 Processes that need to be resumed within 72 hours to maintain near 
normal operations and adequate levels of quality. 
 Processes that can take more than 72 hours and may not be needed 
at all unless the disaster is unusually long. 
3. Assess business continuity options based on the BIA, consider multiple 
recovery strategies. Are there manual processing options or possibility 
of engaging an outside agency (i.e. , DISA), to take over some or all 
operations, establishing a remote, redundant site for mission-critical 
operations. Also consider using a secondary organization for a certain 
percentage of your workflow. Workflow sharing could help maintain 
a level of continuity during disruption.  As part of this step, define 
the specific criteria for declaring a disaster and who is authorized to 
make the declaration. Create a procedure for determining which business 
processes are impacted by the disaster. Be ready to act quickly and 
decisively. If a major disruption occurs, time is your enemy! This gets 
t h e  t e a m  m obilized, minimizes losses and accelerates return to 
normal operations. This step also requires creating an emergency call list. 
The person declaring the disaster must notify key personnel who in turn 
may be asked to notify others. This distributed notification approach 
enables rapid dissemination of information resulting in rapid emergency 
response. 
4. Document and test the plan that is simple and actionable. Such document 
will have to evolve over time and should not create a large maintenance 
task. The plan should be tested at least monthly or annually depending on 
the needs of the organization. Conduct a mock disaster or create a scenario 
that will simulate a disruption. Walk through the plan and ensure sure it is 
still valid. This will help the business evolve and grow. The plan will 
have to change as well if needed. Process owners may find a need to 
make arrangements for offsite or third-party support to fully implement 
the plan. This may take several months requiring some short-term 
survival procedures while the long-term plan is created. It is necessary 
to conduct a review of the results of each test to show needed 
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improvements in the plan to keep the business continuity in the event of 
a disaster. Also, consider involving multiple employees in any mission-
critical process so that lone malicious acts are difficult to accomplish. 
3. Technology 
Process owners need to understand all the physical assets that support each 
process. In a disruption, some or all of those assets may be unavailable. 
1. Identify critical systems like desktop and server computers. There are 
also firewalls, routers, switches, printers, scanners, fax machines, copiers, 
telephones, and so forth. Determine which of these devices are critical to 
the business. Criticality is measured by the ability to conduct business 
without that device. 
2. Examine system administration procedures by reviewing how major 
systems are maintained. Simple disruptions can often be avoided by 
following proper administration procedures. Are computers backed-up 
regularly? Are the backup media stored locally or offsite? Is antivirus 
software installed and updated regularly? If paper files are generated, are 
copies stored locally or offsite? Have the copies been digitized and 
archived for safety? Can your business operate without them? 
3. Consider redundancy options by duplicating or mirroring critical systems. 
This can be done onsite and/or offsite depending on the needs of the 
business. The subject of “failover” (switching to a redundant system when 
the primary system fails) is complex and the solutions can be very 
expensive. For NAVSUP business systems (i.e., ERP which is a 24x7 
operation), redundancy is essential. 
4. EXPLORE, PLAN, EXECUTE, VERIFY. 
Finally, when the BCM framework is completed, the organization will be prepared 
to tackle any severe disruption to the business with confidence. This means that all 
the options are explored, planned for the worst case scenarios, executed a test and 
verified the results. The enterprise is ready! 
Technology is a valuable asset to your business. Make sure you’re in control of it 
at all times. Don’t let a disaster take your business down with it! (D’Amico, 2004).  
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1. List of Department of Defense Directives on Defense Continuity 
Programs 
 DOD 8910.1-M, “Department of Defense Procedures for Management of 
Information Requirements,” June 30, 1998 
 National Communications System Directive 3–10, “Telecommunications 
Operations,” July 25, 2007 
 National Security Presidential Directive-51/Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive-20, “National Continuity Policy,” May 9, 2007 
 “National Continuity Policy Implementation Plan,” August 2007 
 Section 2674 of Title 10, United States Code, Operation and Control of 
Pentagon Reservation and Defense Facilities in National Capital Region 
 
2. List of Department of Defense Instructions on Information Assurance 
(IA) Implementation 
 DOD 5025.1-M, “DOD Directives System Procedures,” March 5, 2003 
 DOD Directive 8000.1, “Management of DOD Information Resources and 
Information Technology,” February 27, 2002  
 DOD Directive 8500.1, “Information Assurance,” October 24, 2002 
 National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security 
Instruction (NSTISSI) No. 4009, “National Information Systems Security 
Glossary,” September 2000 
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